INTRODUCTION
This note will look at the litigation that arose in the lead-up to World Youth Day held in Sydney in July 2008. In Part II, the events that gave rise to Evans v New South Wales 1 will be outlined and the reasons of the Full Court of the Federal Court for its decision briefly explained. The consequences of the Court applying the principle of legality in Evans -which lay at the heart of its reasoning and decision -will be explored in Part III. First, I will consider how it impacted upon the argument made by the applicants that the relevant legislation was invalid for infringing the implied freedom of political communication guaranteed by the Australian Constitution. And second, I will discuss whether the decision in Evans highlights a lacuna in the legal protection of freedom of expression in Australia -as some commentators have suggested -and whether a statutory charter of rights would remedy this. And finally, in Part IV, I will make some observations about the principle of legality and the judicial protection of rights more generally. Taken together, these observations lead me to conclude that the judicial role in the protection of rights in Australia may be best served through the application of the principle of legality rather than an interpretive obligation under a statutory charter of rights. The applicants -the 'No to Pope Coalition' -were an organisation 'of persons and groups … opposed to the teachings of the Catholic Church on sexuality, contraception and reproductive rights.' 2 The Coalition planned to peacefully confront the participants during World Youth Day events to communicate their concerns on these matters. In order to do so, they wanted to provide the pilgrims with 'items including tshirts, leaflets, flyers, stickers, condoms and coat-hangers. The coat-hangers [were] intended to symbolise the death of women from "backyard" abortions.' 3 It was the concern of the applicants that the Act and, in particular, the WYD Regulation, would prohibit them from distributing these materials and therefore preclude their planned protest. Section 46 of the Act prohibited the selling and distributing of 'prescribed articles' in areas controlled by the World Youth Day Coordination Authority 4 and the impugned clauses of the WYD Regulation read as follows:
II THE CASE

A Facts and legislation
Clause 4 (1) For the purposes of the definition of "prescribed article" in section 46 (10) of the Act, the following classes of articles are prescribed: (a) items of food and drink, (b) religious items (for example, rosary beads, candles, candle holders, prayer tokens and prayer cards), (c) items of apparel, including headwear, (for example, t-shirts, jumpers, jackets, pants, pyjamas, singlets, tank tops, shorts, wet weather jackets, caps, visors and hats), (d) clothing accessories (for example, scarves, bandannas, socks, shoes and thongs), (e) jewellery, (f) giftware (for example, key rings, lapel pins, zipper pulls, magnets, removable tattoos, button badges, wristbands, mobile phone accessories, computer accessories, sunglasses, stickers and photo frames), (g) hard goods (for example, bottles, mugs, plates, spoons, ceramics and umbrellas), (h) stationery, (i) textiles (for example, beach towels and tea towels), (j) philatelic and numismatic articles (for example, coins, postage stamps, envelopes and first day covers). Section 46(1) defined an Authority controlled area as any of the following areas: (a) the area comprising, or comprising and adjacent to, a transport facility or interchange or a World Youth Day venue or facility, being an area that is specified or described in an order of the Minister published in the Gazette, (b) a public place, or any part of a public place, that is within 500 metres of a transport facility or interchange or a World Youth Day venue or facility, being a public place, or part of a public place, that is shown on a map referred to in an order of the Minister published in the Gazette. The applicants argued that s 46 of the Act and clauses 4 and 7 of the WYD Regulation were invalid for infringing the implied freedom of political communication guaranteed by the Constitution. 5 In this regard, the High Court has made clear that any legislative or executive action that disproportionately burdens communication necessary for the effective operation of responsible and representative government guaranteed by the Constitution is invalid. 6 The applicants further argued that clauses 4 and 7 went beyond the scope of the regulation-making power provided by the Act and were invalid as a consequence.
At the time there was also some urgency regarding the matter. The Coalition filed and served their application in the Federal Court on July 7 with the main World Youth Day events scheduled to commence on July 15 and conclude on July 20. Consequently, '[t]he Acting Chief Justice considered that the matter was of sufficient importance to justify a direction that the original jurisdiction of the Court in the matter be exercised by a Full Court'. 7
B
Decision and reasoning The decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court (French, Branson and Stone JJ) was delivered per curium on July 15. The Court held as follows:
1 It was within its original jurisdiction to hear and determine the application -as provided by s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) -as it involved a 'matter …arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation'. Moreover, the Court noted that the adverse determination of the federal (constitutional) arguments did not preclude them from determining the non-federal claims; that _____________________________________________________________________________________ 5 I will refer to it as the 'implied freedom' for the remainder of the note.
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Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. is, the proper construction of the impugned New South Wales Act and Regulation. The federal and non-federal claims involved in the controversy 'are all part of the federal jurisdiction conferred upon the Court. Nor does it matter to the scope of that jurisdiction whether the federal claim is defeated by a question of law or fact. That proposition is supported by a long line of authority.' 8 2 The list of 'prescribed articles' in cl 4 were authorised by the regulation-making power of the Act. However, the items the applicants wished to provide to the pilgrims were not 'prescribed articles' on a proper construction of s 46 and cl 4 and could, therefore, be lawfully distributed at World Youth Day events. Consequently, no question then arose as to the compatibility or otherwise of s 46 or cl 4 with the implied freedom. 3 Clause 7(1)(b) -'to the extent that it purports to empower an authorised person to direct a person within a World Youth Day declared area to cease engaging in conduct that causes annoyance to participants in a World Youth Day event' 9 -was not authorised by the regulation-making power of the Act and was therefore invalid. The other elements of cl 7 were so authorised and did not, moreover, infringe the implied freedom 'because they [were] directed not to communication, but to public safety and interference with the rights and freedoms of others.' 10 In any event, in order to explain the reasoning of the Federal Court on the two substantive limbs of its decision (points 2 and 3 above) it is worth extracting s 58 of the Act which conferred the power to make regulations in the following terms:
(1) The Governor may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, for or with respect to any matter that by this Act is required or permitted to be prescribed or that is necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act. (2) In particular, regulations may be made for or with respect to the following:
(a) the fees and charges that may be imposed for the purposes of this Act, (b) regulating the use by the public of, and the conduct of the public on, World Youth Day venues and facilities, (c) regulating the provision of services by the Authority, (d) requiring the payment of fares or other charges for the use of any facility operated or service provided by the Authority or a government agency for the purposes of this Act, (e) conferring on the Authority any function that may be exercised by a council in relation to a public place, (f The Court held that 'the validity of cl 4 cannot successfully be challenged on the grounds that it is not authorised by s 46(3).' 13 We do not accept the applicants' submission that 'there is simply no warrant in the Act to justify the prescription by regulation of articles such as food and drink, candles and stickers and hard goods'. There is nothing in the definition of 'prescribed article' that would exclude such articles from the ambit of regulation under s 46. 14 It then fell to the Court to consider whether the items the applicants wished to give the pilgrims -condoms, coat-hangers, t-shirts, candles, stickers, button badges and leaflets -were 'prescribed articles' under cl 4. They held that nothing in the listed classes of articles covered condoms 15 or (symbolic) coat-hangers 16 and though leaflets and flyers may once have been 'stationery' they no longer could be so characterised when printed. 17 Of more difficulty was whether the stickers and button badges were 'giftware'. The Court defined 'giftware' as 'articles of merchandise that are used as gifts' and noted that a classification as such 'may depend on context.' 18 So certain kinds of stickers and button badges -for example, those that 'might serve as souvenirs of the event and appropriate gifts for those who have an interest in the event' 19 -may well constitute 'giftware' and therefore be caught by cl 4(1)(f). However, '[t]he same could not be said of the button badges and stickers that the applicants propose to Ibid.
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Federal Law Review
Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ distribute.' 20 Presumably this is because with messages such as 'I don't believe Mary was a virgin! Is that annoying?' and 'I don't believe the Pope is infallible! Is that annoying?' 21 they were hardly the sorts of event 'souvenirs' and 'gifts' that s 46 and cl 4 sought to prohibit from being sold and distributed to the pilgrims during the World Youth Day events. A similar interpretive logic was applied to the characterisation of the applicants' t-shirts. Though clearly 'items of apparel' on the face of it -indeed 'tshirts' were noted as one of the relevant examples in cl 4(1)(c) -the slogans which they were to bear placed them outside the class of articles contemplated by the WYD Regulation in the Court's view. 22 In the result, none of the items which the applicants wished to distribute to the pilgrims were 'prescribed articles' under cl 4. It therefore followed that no issue as to the compatibility or otherwise of s 46 and cl 4 with the implied freedom could logically arise, even if the applicants' proposed conduct did amount to constitutionally protected political communication, which I would have thought likely on the facts. In this regard, the High Court in Lange said that the implied freedom 'necessarily protect[s] that freedom of communication between the people concerning political or government matters which enables the people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors.' 23 Relevantly, in Evans the Court noted that the applicants were members of community groups that 'campaign[ed] on issues such as the Federal same-sex marriage ban and civil unions' and sought 'to persuade political parties at both Federal and State level to adopt policy positions that reflect the organisation's views and, where appropriate, to legislate to implement those policy positions.' 24 Their proposed conduct formed part of this political activism and would likely be considered 'political communication' as a consequence, in my view, for its capacity to inform federal voting choices.
2
The invalidity of clause 7(1)(b) of the WYD Regulation As noted, the Court held cl 7(1)(b) of the WYD Regulation exceeded the regulationmaking power of the Act and was invalid as a consequence. This followed from the application of what is now (judicially) known as the principle of legality. The Court, by way of explanation, cited the following High Court authority:
The courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakeable and unambiguous language. General words will rarely be sufficient for that purpose if they do not specifically deal with the question because, in the context in which they appear, they will often be ambiguous on the aspect of interference with fundamental rights. 25 In the context of s 58(2)(b) of the Act -which provided the power to make regulations for the regulation 'of the public on, World Youth Day venues and facilities' -the Court observed:
The term 'regulating … the conduct of the public' is capable of a range of constructions from the regulation of any conceivable conduct to the regulation of conduct relevant to the events on World Youth Day. It may encompass acts and some or all forms of speech The Court acknowledged that the range of conduct prescribed by cl 7 implicated, at the very least, freedom of speech and said that '[w]hatever debate there may be about particular rights there is little scope … for disputing that personal liberty, including freedom of speech, is regarded as fundamental subject to reasonable regulation for the purposes of an ordered society.' 27 Also pertinent to the proper construction of cl 7 in the context of the World Youth Day events was the significance of freedom of religious belief and expression within Australia's constitutional arrangements and under international law. The Court noted in this regard that 's 116 of the Constitution bars the Commonwealth from making any law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion' and that religious 'freedom is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'. 28 It led the Court to conclude:
No doubt conduct could validly be regulated which involves disruption of, or interference with, the free expression of religious beliefs by participants in WYD events. Clause 7(1)(c) relating to obstruction of WYD events is properly directed to such ends. 29 However, the power provided to an authorised person by cl 7(1)(b) to direct a person at a World Youth Day event 'to cease from engaging in conduct that causes annoyance' to its participants was problematic on freedom of speech grounds and for its textual (and therefore legal) indeterminacy. The indeterminacy was said to arise from the fact that some of the pilgrims may have found the planned protests of the applicants to be 'mildly amusing' whilst others may have been 'annoyed by them' in the relevant sense. 30 'There [was] no objective criterion to assist the judgment of "an authorised person" in deciding whether to issue a direction under cl 7.' 31 The application by the Court of the principle of legality to this harm threshold ('causes annoyance') proved fatal to its validity.
In our opinion the conduct regulated by cl 7(1)(b) so far as it relates to 'annoyance' may extend to expressions of opinion which neither disrupt nor interfere with the freedoms of others, nor are objectively offensive in the sense traditionally used in State criminal statutes. Breach of this provision as drafted affects freedom of speech in a way that, in our opinion, is not supported by the statutory power conferred by s 58 properly construed. Moreover there is no intelligible boundary within which the "causes annoyance" limb of s 7 can be read down to save it as a valid expression of the regulating power. 32 The Court issued a declaration to this effect, notwithstanding the argument made by the State that to do so would involve the improper determination of an abstract or hypothetical legal controversy as 'the precise nature of the conduct in which the In this part of the note I will outline and critique the central reasoning of the Evans decision. I will do so by considering how the interpretive process (including the application of the principle of legality) meant that the question of constitutional validity of the legislative regime fell away in the Court's view. I then turn to assess the extent to which the principle of legality (compared with a statutory bill of rights) can provide meaningful protection of fundamental rights (including freedom of expression) in Australia.
A
The constitutional issue: did it fall away or was it avoided? In Evans, the applicants, as noted, argued that s 46(3) of the Act and clauses 4 and 7 of the WYD Regulation were invalid for infringing the implied freedom. The Court responded that '[i]f either of the clauses of the Regulation is not valid because it is not authorised by the WYD Act, then the question of constitutional validity falls away.' 35 To this end, as outlined in Part II, the Court held that none of the items the applicants wished to distribute were 'prescribed articles' under s 46(3) and cl 4 taken together and narrowly construed, and that the application of the principle of legality to cl 7 did invalidate that part of (1)(b) that sought to regulate conduct that may cause 'annoyance' to the pilgrims. Consequently, 'the question of constitutional validity falls away.' 36 This is the orthodox interpretive approach under Australian law: 37 If on its proper construction a statute does not offend against any constitutional limitation or prohibition it is not ordinarily appropriate for the Court to hypothesis a different construction and then test its constitutionality. 38 So the constitutional issue in the context of the applicants' proposed conduct was no longer a live one once the Court found that none of the articles they wished to distribute were 'prescribed' and the application of the principle of legality to cl 7(1)(b) rendered it invalid. It led the Court to conclude:
Read together with cl 4 of the Regulation for the reasons which we have outlined above, it does not impact on the proposed conduct of the applicants in any way that would constitute a burden on their implied freedom of political communication. This necessarily follows, as the applicants' proposed conduct was found to be lawful through the interpretive process (and regulation invalidation) just described. There appeared, however, to be suggestions in the Court's judgment that they were not entirely comfortable with the breadth and scope of the legislative regime. For example, as it found that the items that the applicants wished to distribute to pilgrims were not caught by cl 4 then '[t]he question whether the reach of cl 4 may be excessive in other respects [was] not before the Court.' 40 Similarly, on the issue of the legality or otherwise of the applicants' wish to distribute candles the Court said:
There was little argument and no evidence given on these matters at the hearing. It [was] not possible for us to express an opinion as to which candles would be prohibited as religious items and which would not. The issue could only be resolved in the context of a particular prosecution brought following a failure to comply with regulation. 41 And there appeared even some ambivalence in the Court's conclusion (quoted above) that the interpretive process undertaken 'is sufficient to dispose of the constitutional challenge to s 46(3) within the framework of the case presented to the court.' 42 These observations may of course have been no more than the Court making clear to the applicants that it will only finally determine those legal issues which squarely arise on the facts. But if they suggest that aspects of the legislative regime may be constitutionally problematic if considered in a different factual context -that is, regarding (proposed) conduct that is prima facie caught -then such an approach may have a downside from a rights perspective. And, arguably, it is to avoid the constitutional (implied freedom) issue through statutory interpretation rather than it falling away. But before considering whether this approach has a rights downside, I will briefly address the important threshold issue of whether it was even constitutionally permissible for the Court to consider the issue of the implied freedom in Evans once they held the applicants (proposed) conduct was lawful.
The issue is whether it is constitutionally permissible for a Court exercising federal judicial power to determine the issue of the implied freedom if the applicants' proposed conduct or manner in which they argue their case does not in the Court's view challenge or impugn all those aspects of the legislative scheme that may be constitutionally suspect. That is, would such a determination amount to the resolution of an abstract or hypothetical legal question contrary to the Chapter III of the Constitution? In the process of explaining when it may provide for declaratory relief, the Court in Evans approved the following passage from the judgment of Lockhart J in Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd:
The applicant for declaratory relief will not have sufficient status if relief is 'claimed in relation to circumstances that [have] not occurred and might never happen' … or if the Court's declaration will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties. 43 There is at least an argument that this principle gives a Court, in cases like Evans, sufficient scope to fully determine the compatibility or otherwise of a law with the 
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Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ implied freedom. In Evans, for example, the applicants' proposed conduct involved the kind of direct political action in a crowded public space that will always have the capacity to play out in ways not planned but foreseeable that may enliven other parts of the legislative scheme. Moreover, as the Court explained in Evans:
Importantly, the declaration sought is not about the lawfulness of the future conduct of the applicants in which event a degree of precision in the definition of that conduct would be necessary before such relief could be contemplated. What is sought is a declaration of the invalidity of an aspect of a law of general application. 44 Assuming that it was permissible for the Court to more fully consider the constitutionality of the legislative scheme, then choosing not to may have a rights consequence. In the American context, Frederick Schauer argues that this interpretive approach -known as the Ashwander principle 45 -does not in fact avoid constitutional issues. 46 If in order to avoid a constitutional question the natural reading of a statute is displaced by a more strained -but nonetheless open on the text -construction then a court is impliedly recognising that without such an approach the statute may be constitutionally suspect. For if a court considers that a constitutional argument has little or no merit then it is unnecessary to give the words of the statute anything other than their ordinary and natural construction. Moreover and relevantly for present purposes, Schauer suggests that '[l]ike the Ashwander principle, plain statement rules [the American analogue of the principle of legality] sneak constitutional considerations in the back door, and thus again are instances not of avoiding constitutional questions but of deciding them.' 47 Consequently, if the rationale of employing statutory interpretation (including the application of the principle of legality) to avoid constitutional issues is to avoid the costs of 'allowing an unelected judiciary unnecessarily to exercise the power to invalidate the acts of coordinate branches of the … government', then it is an interpretive approach that in Schauer's view must at the very least be re-evaluated.
[I]n interpreting statutes so as to avoid 'unnecessary' constitutional decisions, the Court frequently interprets a statute in ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and, constitutional questions aside, in ways that its drafters may not have preferred. Accordingly, it is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a … statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial 
This is also the orthodox interpretive approach in American law -see Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority 297 US 288, 347-8 (1936) (Brandeis J); Edward J DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council 485 US 568 (1988). In some respects this makes good practical sense as the frequency of the United States Constitution
(particularly its Bill of Rights) potentially intersecting with State and federal statutes is likely to be far greater than in the Australian constitutional context. It may also be politically and institutionally prudent for American courts to employ this interpretive approach wherever possible considering the robust and ongoing debate about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review. 47 Schauer, above n 45, 87-8 (footnote omitted).
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Evans v New South Wales 303 ____________________________________________________________________________________ invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute. 48 However, even if the Court was not engaging in constitutional avoidance in Evans, the argument is still worth considering in the context of Australian (constitutional) law more generally. In Coleman v Power, for example, Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ applied the principle of legality to give a narrow construction to a broad and imprecise public order offence. 49 In doing so they preserved the law's validity and avoided the issue of assessing its compatibility with the implied freedom. 50 But Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ made clear that if the public order offence was not (narrowly) construed in this way then it would have infringed the implied freedom. 51 It might, therefore, be argued that a downside of applying the principle of legality as a method of constitutional avoidance in cases like Coleman (and maybe Evans) is that, from a rights perspective, it spares broadbrush and amorphous legal rules from rigorous constitutional scrutiny. It leaves on the statute book laws that have a very real capacity to chill freedom of (political) speech 52 and that may, in any event, be found constitutionally suspect in the event of a future prosecution. 53 This is particularly so if it's an approach that 'sneak[s] constitutional considerations in the back door' 54 and into the interpretation process in any event. And to squarely confront the issue of the implied freedom may also better honour the spirit of giving constitutional rights and guarantees a broad construction, an approach that has often (though not always) characterised the contemporary rights jurisprudence of the High Court. 55 However, for the reasons that I will detail in Part IV below a judge may considerquite properly in my view -that the principle of legality still ought to be applied in these circumstances. That is, I will argue that in the interests of political responsibility, institutional modesty and constitutional harmony the judicial protection of rights is, on balance, best served by the application of the common law principle of legality where it is interpretively possible. 
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The rights protective capacity of the principle of legality (compared with a statutory charter of rights)
In the aftermath of Evans, George Williams and Nicola McGarrity lamented the fact that '[t]he court did not strike down the law because it infringed basic rights. It fell over on a technicality that can be easily repaired.' 56 They were referring to the application of the principle of legality to cl 7 of the WYD Regulation that resulted in the invalidity of sub-cl (1)(b).
The Federal Court decision means that regulations outlawing annoying conduct can be made in the future. As the NSW Government argued in court: 'The State Parliament has the power to make these kinds of laws if they wanted to.' There is little doubt that this is correct. The only restriction is that Parliament must make the law clear and wide enough to show it really did intend to restrict freedom of speech. 57 It is certainly true that clear and unambiguous statutory language will trump the interpretive presumption against the infringement of common law rights and freedoms. 58 However, there must be a serious question as to whether a law that is clear and wide enough to catch annoying conduct would be compatible with the implied freedom. Indeed, as my above analysis suggests, the application of the principle of legality may well have preserved the constitutional validity of cl 7(1)(b). In any event, for Williams and McGarrity the Evans decision illuminates the fragile nature of freedom of speech in Australia. The right deserves better protection than the legal presumption that Parliament does not intend to breach the right unless it sets this out in clear terms. It is long past time that such an important freedom was safeguarded in a national charter of human rights. 59 The underlying assumption is, then, that a charter of rights would provide more robust protection of freedom of speech than the application of the principle of legality in cases like Evans. However, I think it is far from self-evident that this would be the case assuming the rights charter contemplated by Williams and McGarrity is of the statutory kind operating in the ACT and Victoria. 60 The charters do provide a strong guarantee of the right to freedom of expression. 61 However, rights in a statutory charter -such as freedom of expression -are not self-executing or legal trumps as is the case in jurisdictions with constitutional bills of rights. That is, they do not operate to invalidate legislation or executive action held by the courts to infringe rights. Instead they rely mostly on the interpretive obligation found in statutory charters for their efficacy and legal bite. In the Victorian Charter, for example, that interpretive obligation reads as follows: 62 (1) So far as it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights. (2) International law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and international courts and tribunals relevant to a human right may be considered in interpreting a statutory provision. (3) This section does not affect the validity of-(a) an Act or provision of an Act that is incompatible with a human right; or (b) a subordinate instrument or provision of a subordinate instrument that is incompatible with a human right and is empowered to be so by the Act under which it is made.
So in the context of interpreting laws of the kind considered in Evans a court must, if possible, give them a construction which is compatible with their underlying purpose and the right to freedom of expression. If it cannot do so for primary legislation (like s 46 of the Act) it may issue a declaration of incompatibility which then places certain legal obligations on the Parliament in respect of the law but does not invalidate it. 63 On the other hand -and in the absence of an express regulationmaking power that permits the infringement of charter rights -if delegated legislation (like the WYD Regulation) cannot be given a rights compatible interpretation then it is invalid. This necessarily follows from the application of the core interpretive obligation to the provision in primary legislation that delegates the power to make regulations. That power can only sustain the making of regulations that are rights compatible as a consequence. 64 In any event and most relevantly for present purposes, as Chief Justice Spigelman of the New South Wales Supreme Court has recently pointed out, when a 'rightscompliant interpretation provision is made expressly subject to the purposive requirement [as is now the case with the interpretive obligations in both the ACT and Victorian charters], its operation would probably be very similar to the principle of legality.' 65 In other words, the core interpretive obligation when discharged by courts under a statutory rights charter -to construe laws in a manner that is compatible with their purpose and rights if possible -is essentially the same as applying that aspect of the principle of legality that says courts 'decline to impute to Parliament an intention to
Federal Law Review
Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ abrogate or curtail fundamental human rights or freedoms unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language'. 66 Consequently, if Evans was decided in a charter jurisdiction in Australia, the court would hold that it was possible to interpret s 46(3) of the Act and cl 4 of the WYD Regulation in a manner that was consistent with the purpose of the legislative regime and protected the applicants' freedom of expression. 67 In the Court's view that purpose was 'to prevent risks to public safety, inconvenience to World Youth Day participants and disruption of World Youth Day events.' 68 Whereas that part of cl 7 which sought to regulate conduct that causes annoyance to the World Youth Day pilgrims could not be construed consistently with that purpose and the right to freedom of expression of the applicants as it may catch 'expressions of opinion which neither disrupt nor interfere with the freedoms of others'. 69 It would therefore be invalid as s 58 of the Act -the provision which grants regulation-making powerdid not expressly authorise the creation of regulations that infringed freedom of expression.
The upshot is that in jurisdictions with statutory charters of rights the result in Evans (and cases like it) would have been the same. This also suggests that -at least in terms of judicial outcomes 70 -freedom of expression is not, necessarily, better protected under a statutory rights charter than in a jurisdiction where the principle of legality holds sway.
I do not, however, wish to suggest that the principle of legality affords the same protection to the full panoply of human rights as a statutory rights charter. It clearly doesn't. The scope of rights considered by the common law to be 'fundamental' -and therefore subject to and protected by the principle of legality -is not only contested 71 but is considerably narrower than the rights enshrined in the statutory rights charters operating in the ACT and Victoria. 72 And as Chief Justice Spigelman has suggested, it may well be the case that interpretive obligations in statutory rights charters 'can have some additional force when there is doubt about Parliament's intention in other For example, it is not a fundamental right at common law to be free from discrimination on the grounds of gender, race or religion. However, the right to legal equality is enshrined in the statutory bills of rights operating in the ACT and Victoria: see generally Chief Justice James Spigelman, 'The Common Law Bill of Rights' in Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights (2008) 1.
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Evans v New South Wales 307 ____________________________________________________________________________________ legislation because it is more likely that the judiciary will apply an express parliamentary authority than a common law principle.' 73 However, I do think that in the context of protecting rights in general, and freedom of expression in particular, that the principle of legality is not merely a 'convoluted legal fiction'. 74 As Gleeson CJ has noted:
The presumption is not merely a common sense guide to what a Parliament in a liberal democracy is likely to have intended; it is a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted. The hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law. 75 In this regard my analysis above demonstrates the rights protective capacity of the principle of legality and how it would be wrong to dismiss the significance and importance of orthodox principles of statutory interpretation in the protection of human rights in a contemporary context.
IV THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA: SOME OBERVATIONS
In the final part of the note I will make four observations about the principle of legality and judicial protection of rights more generally. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ idea of the principle of legality is that it forces Parliament to take political responsibility for its legislative actions. A judicial condemnation of legislation on rights grounds on the other hand gives legislators the political opportunity to 'hit back' at the courts for thwarting the democratic will of the people. And the fact that Parliament can still have the final say -and therefore responsibility -on rights issues under statutory charters of rights does not resolve this problem for the courts. Even if the Parliament resolves to amend its legislation to comply with a judicial rights declaration 79 the courts may still be assailed by the other arms of government, the media and the wider citizenry. For example, criticism may be levelled for vindicating the rights of unpopular minorities (a common occurrence under rights charters and during the war on terror) or for 'forcing' 80 the Parliament to amend its legislation to comply with the rights views of 'unelected and unaccountable judges'. 81 In any event, as a consequence the courts may (reasonably or not) take some of the political opprobrium for legislation that the Parliament would and should otherwise have to accept in full.
My second and related observation relates to the common law lineage of the principle of legality. The slow and incremental development of the principle has imbued it with the collective experience and wisdom of centuries of judicial decisionmaking. 82 This common law pedigree gives the principle of legality its strength, legitimacy and centrality in our system of constitutional government. Indeed it makes clear why this interpretive principle is now often characterised as 'quasiconstitutional' 83 for it 'reflect[s] fundamental assumptions about the relationship between citizen and state.' 84 Similarly important in my view is that it leaves it to Parliament alone to strike the (difficult) balance in legislation between the full range of competing rights and interests that inevitably arise in complex issues of social policy. In order to do so it has the procedures for meaningful collective deliberation, the ability to be proactive (not simply reactive to litigation) and, most importantly, has the time and resources to undertake parliamentary and departmental inquiries on these issues and produce detailed and expert accompanying reports. These institutional characteristics and strengths of Parliament make it far better equipped and capable of undertaking this sort of complex polycentric decision-making than the courts in my view. 85 However, the interpretive obligation in statutory rights charters may well compel the courts to do something very similar in most 'rights' cases. The point is not that such an interpretive process is undemocratic -it is Parliament after all that has placed this interpretive obligation on judges 86 -but that the courts lack the same institutional strengths of Parliament needed to address the variety of complex social policy issues that arise in assessing the compatibility or otherwise of legislation with a statutory bill of rights. The courts may well be on a hiding to nothing regarding their interpretive role and decision-making under a statutory rights charter. They lack the institutional resources needed to properly discharge this very difficult role and their rights assessments, no matter how legally sound and well-reasoned given the circumstances, will always be contested considering the intractable nature of most rights disputes. Again, the fact that Parliament can -if it chooses -have the final say on rights issues under statutory charters does not in my view change the problematic nature of this judicial role. The long term risk is that the authority of judicial decision-making more generally may be eroded if the public and the other arms of government consider its rights jurisprudence -a clearly important and high profile part of its judicial workto be too close to the contested political realm and less worthy of respect as a consequence. It would be most unfortunate if the well-intentioned expectation that the protection of human rights would be better served by an increased judicial role resulted in the legitimacy of the judicial function being increasingly called into question.
My third observation is that the principle of legality -compared with the interpretive obligation under statutory rights charters -provides for the kind of 'institutional interaction' 87 between the courts and Parliament that may better reflect the established and accepted role of the judiciary under the Australian system of constitutional government. That role involves the final and conclusive determination of the legality of legislative and governmental action that is so critical to the maintenance of the rule of law. In doing so, the courts inevitably clash with the legitimate interests and priorities of the other arms of government. This tension is no bad thing. Indeed it is considered a desirable state of affairs in a constitutional democracy like Australia where the separation of powers holds sway. 88 On the other
Volume 37 ____________________________________________________________________________________ hand, the making of (rights) declarations in cases that have no legal effect on the litigating parties or the impugned law -which currently occurs under the charters operating in the ACT and Victoria -is not something that Australian courts traditionally do. 89 For example, under the Victorian Charter it is expressly provided that a judicial declaration of the rights incompatibility of legislation does not affect its validity. Moreover, in the event that a public authority infringes the Charter rights of a citizen, no damages may be awarded for that breach and no enforceable legal right or civil cause of action is created. 90 This is not to suggest that courts ought never to be vested with new powers and functions. They, like all institutions of government, must evolve to meet new challenges in order to remain relevant. 91 But consider the High Court's classic statement of what constitutes 'judicial power':
[It is] the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action. 92 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 89
For example, the jurisdiction of the High Court and all other federal courts established under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution extends only to the hearing and determination of 'matters'. The High Court has said that 'there can be no matter …unless there is some immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of the Court': Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke JJ). On the other hand, State courts can be vested with and exercise both judicial and non-judicial powers so long as the latter do not compromise their independence and institutional integrity as a court: Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575. However, the following passage makes clear the essence of the judicial function in Australia: 'Judges do not set their own agenda. They deal with issues that litigants bring to them for decision. They cannot avoid questions that have to be answered to decide the cases that come to them; and they cannot answer questions that are not brought to them for decision. Australian courts do not give advisory opinions. They resolve concrete issues raised by disputing litigants': Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, The Rule of Law and the Constitution (2000) 99.
